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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh siklus pengambilan keputusan pada penawaran individu dalam 
eksperimen lelang. Eksperimen sebelumnya melibatkan proses pelelangan yang terdiri atas sejumlah 
sesi dalam jangka waktu yang relatif singkat, dimana informasi tentang nilai sebenarnya dari objek 
yang dilelang diberikan secara langsung, sehingga jumlah dana yang dipegang oleh peserta lelang 
dapat disesuaikan seketika. Kemenangan dan kekalahan dalam sebuah lelang dapat menimbulkan 
emosi positif dan  negatif. Karena orang memerlukan waktu untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan penga-
laman afektif, siklus keputusan dalam eksperimen dapat berpengaruh dalam keputusan individu pada 
penawaran berikutnya. Hipotesa yang diajukan adalah bahwa penyesalan dan akuntansi mental 
dapat menjelaskan arah dari anomali dalam keputusan tersebut. Penyesalan atas kegagalan untuk 
bertindak dalam putaran tender sebelumnya akan menaikkan tingkat pengambilan resiko pada babak 
berikutnya; dan akuntansi topikal lebih mendominasi pengambilan keputusan daripada akuntansi 
minimal dan akuntansi komprehensif. Selain itu, reference dependence utility menyebabkan prefensi 
resiko berbeda-beda sesuai dengan konteks pengambilan keputusan: risk-seeking dilakukan ketika 
mengalami kerugian, sementara risk-aversion dilakukan setelah mendapatkan keuntungan. Secara 
umum penelitian ini mendukung dugaan-dugaan tersebut. Subjek menjadi lebih agresif setelah 
mengalami kerugian dalam tahap sebelumnya. Sementara penyesalan dapat diamati pada subjek 
yang mengajukan penawaran kedua tertinggi ketika aspek winner’s curse tidak manifes, dana spek 
penyesalan ini menyebabkan naiknya penawaran pada putaran berikutnya. Akibatnya regret 
menyebabkan subjek menjadi korban winner’s curse. Pada aspek psikologis, akuntansi topical 
teramati lebih banyak dilakukan individu dari pada akuntansi komprehensif. Temuan ini berimpli-
kasi keraguan atas validitas klaim adanya fenomena winner’s curse dalam eksperimen lelang. 
Keywords: mental accounting, decision making, bidding behaviour.  
 
Although1the evidence of the winner’s 
curse has appeared robustly in a variety of 
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laboratory contexts (e.g., Kagel & Levin, 
1986; Dyer, Kagel & Levin, 1989; Garvin & 
Kagel, 1994), and support from analysis of 
real auction data has also been reported 
(e.g., Capen, Clapp & Campbell, 1971; Roll, 
1986; Giliberto & Varaiya, 1989), its exis-
tence is still largely questioned. Referring to 
the complexity and incompleteness of in-
formation concerning the present and fu-
ture values of auctioned objects, such as oil 
and mineral exploration rights, some ex-
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perts argue that such data allow many in-
terpretations, and the winner’s curse is just 
one of them (Roth, 1995). On the other 
hand, the unanimous claim from many 
laboratory experiments has been responded 
by some experts with critical views towards 
the validity of the design of experiments. In 
short, the winner’s curse is still largely per-
ceived as an anomaly which does not gen-
eralise outside the laboratory 
Criticisms of experimental studies have 
mostly been addressed at the appropriate-
ness of the subjects of experiment. As a 
matter of fact, students whom apparently 
have little real world experience in doing 
auctions have been the most frequently 
employed in research. Therefore, the find-
ings that inexperienced bidders were sus-
ceptible to the winner’s curse (Kagel & 
Levin, 1986) turns to suspicion about the 
validity of the claim. In addition of being 
inexperienced, novice bidders in those ex-
periments were given limited liability for 
losses and were operating at low cash bal-
ance (Hansen & Lott, 1991). The combina-
tion of lack of experience, inadequate con-
trol over sub-optimal actions, and low per-
ceived significance of the task that pre-
ceded the observed winner’s curse may 
actually mean that it is simply a phenome-
non of college students working on a “toy 
problem” (Thaler, 1992) 
In view of the debate, proponent of the 
winner’s curse have responded with refined 
studies to accommodate elements of the 
criticisms, in one and another way. The 
experience factor has been controlled by 
running the experiment in two stages, in 
which only successful bidders in the first 
stage played the second one (Kagel & 
Levin, 1986). An alternative approach has 
been to recruit business executives as the 
experiment subjects (Dyer, Kagel & Levin, 
1989). These studies concluded that al-
though bidders’ susceptibility to the win-
ner’s curse decreased with the accumulation 
of experience, the error was not eliminated 
completely. Relatively experienced bidders 
were found to commit errors in making 
judgement about the value of the object, 
even when the availability of public infor-
mation was increased (Kagel & Levin, 
1986), and even when they are operating at 
a private value auction (Kagel, Harstad & 
Levin, 1987).  
The persistence of judgement errors 
across different experimental manipula-
tions gives raise to a suspicion that the 
anomaly might not be caused by error in 
probabilistic judgement, but by some men-
tal illusion (Thaler, 1992) that was elicited 
accidentally by the design of experiments. 
As a matter of fact, most auction experi-
ments can be easily distinguished from one 
and another, except on the procedure of 
experiment. Most experiments involved an 
auction event that consists of several ses-
sions with a relatively short duration, in 
which a feedback about the true value of 
the object was given instantly, and bidders’ 
cash balance were adjusted promptly. 
During the experiment subjects were con-
ditioned to perform a cycle of tasks that 
consists of receiving and analysing infor-
mation, submitting a bid, discerning feed-
back about the true value of the object, and 
calculating their profit or loss. All of these 
must be done in a timely sequence that 
consists of 20 or so repetitions, within 2 
hours or so. 
This cyclical event, particularly with 
the availability of instant feedback, is unli-
kely to represent the real face of auctions. 
Therefore, if the criticism of field data that 
bidders normally have to wait for relatively 
long time to know the true value of the 
item they have won is accepted (Roth, 
1995), the fact that within 5 minutes a bid-
der in an experiment completed the whole 
process of auction-related events is then an 
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anomaly in itself. It is plausible, therefore, 
to ponder a seemingly weird idea that this 
structural anomaly may actually breed 
anomalous behaviour among subjects of 
experiments.  
Affective Experience and Decision-Making 
A bidding event imposes gains and 
loses to every bidder (McAfee & McMilan, 
1987). Both of these states of nature have 
widely been known to induce sensations 
and emotions among individuals that in 
turn gives intrinsic value to the individual 
(Kusser & Spohn, 1992). Hence, two aspects 
of utility actually emerge from a bidding 
event: the objective outcome of winning or 
losing that is measured in monetary equal 
units and the subjective experience of satis-
faction or anguish. While the former has 
been considered thoroughly in decision-
making theory, very little attention has 
been given to the latter. 
The reason for the ignorance is that 
that because utility is treated as a unitary 
concept in standard economics and deci-
sion-making theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; 
Coombs, Dawes & Tversky, 1970). It is as-
sumed that an individual chooses A over B 
because the utility of A exceeds that of B, 
and thus we can assign any two unequal 
numbers to represent all necessary infor-
mation about the difference of utility 
among them. In contrast, behavioural deci-
sion-making theorists, such as Kahneman 
and his associates, argue that decision util-
ity and experienced utility are two different 
matters (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Kahneman, Waker & Sarin, 1997). In con-
ceptual terms, decision utility is defined as 
the post-hoc inference of the weight of an 
outcome of a decision, while experienced 
utility referes to the utility that is actually 
experienced by decision makers when they 
consume or experience what they have 
chosen. Experienced utility captures the 
hedonic quality of a decision, that is the 
degree of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or 
anguish in the actual experience of outcome. 
One aspect of experienced utility is its 
temporal dimension. Pleasure and dis-
pleasure are attributes of each moment of 
experience, but the outcomes that people 
value are normally extended over time. 
Two descriptive notions of experienced 
utility are thus instant utility, the pleasure 
or distress of the moment, and remembered 
utility that is the retrospective evaluation of 
a temporally extended outcome (Kahne-
man, Waker & Sarin, 1997). The adaptive 
function of instant utility is to signal to the 
individual whether or not to take action in 
a particular moment based on, in most 
situations, the biologically programmed 
response choice. A pleasure sensation 
would normally signal a ‘go’ to the organ-
ism to continue the activities, while pain 
signals a ‘stop’. 
The other dimension is the intensity of 
the affective experience. The experience of 
pleasure and pain are different in quality, 
as well as the experience of joy or distress 
in different occasions. This dimension gives 
raise to the important of remembered util-
ity (Kahneman, Waker & Sarin, 1997), that 
is, the utility of an experience as recalled by 
the decision maker after it has occurred 
(Read & Loewenstein, 1999). In general, 
higher intensity of the experience leads to 
longer retention in individuals’ cognition. 
However, remembered utility is not only a 
function of intensity. Distractions within 
the elapsed time played significant role in 
the elicitation of experienced utility (Read 
& Loewenstein, 1999). 
Both of these dimensions are relevant 
in discussing the side effect of the design of 
auction experiments on individuals’ be-
haviour. The temporal dimension implies 
that certain duration is needed by an indi-
vidual to adjust his- or herself to the affec-
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tive experience of the previous occasion. 
Subsequently, it will influence her func-
tioning in the forthcoming event. The 
stronger intensity of affective experience 
would normally require longer period of 
adjustment. However, the direction to 
which an affective experience influences 
individual, positively or negatively, de-
pends on the type of experience. 
Among others, the impact of regret on 
decision-making is one of most widely re-
searched. Regret is a negative, cognitively 
based emotion that we experience when 
realising or imagining that our present 
situation would have been better, had we 
decided differently (Zeelenberg, 1999). In 
other words, regret constitutes a special 
form of frustration in which the event one 
would change is an action one has either 
taken or failed to take. Two state of events 
thus associated with regret, the one being 
frustration that is felt over the failure of an 
action. One may become frustrated by the 
thinking of another way that he could have 
taken that would have given him a better 
result. Regret also occurs following a failure 
of acting something that lead to a better 
condition or prevent an adverse situation 
had the one done in the time. Research 
shows that the regret associated with fail-
ures to act is often less intense than the re-
gret associated with the failure of an action 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In addition, 
anticipated regret can promote risk-averse 
as well as risk-seeking choice (Zeelenberg, 
1999). 
Consider the following hypothetical 
event: Dick and Fred are competing in an 
experimental bidding session along with 
some other bidders. In a particular session, 
they realised that in the previous session, 
where they had both lost, the bid item was 
of considerably higher value. If Dick real-
ised that his bid was the second highest, 
with a narrow difference from the winner, 
and Fred’s was among the lowest bids, we 
could ask ourselves of who had more in-
tense regret. Subsequently, we could 
imagine how they would bid on the next 
session and predict who would take more 
risks.  
Hiphothesis 1: In the absence of the win-
ner’s curse, in the subsequent round, 
the second highest bidder of the previ-
ous round bids higher than the lowest 
bidders of the previous round. 
Mental Accounting 
One of the cornerstones of optimal 
bidding theory is the assumption of bid-
ders’ risk- neutrality and the linear utility 
of bids. Further, each bidder is assumed to 
estimate other bidders’ valuations as being 
drawn from a rectangular distribution that 
consists of vi, …, vn, in which any point in 
the F(v,) has similar probability of being 
the true value. The probability of winning 
the auction, given bi, is then the function of 
the probability that bi is highest among oth-
ers, that is Fn-1(bi) (Milgrom & Weber, 1982; 
McAfee & McMilan, 1987). These assump-
tion are formulated because they are re-
quired for a simple solution of optimal bid-
ding, not because they capture the natural 
process of bidding. The optimal bidding 
follows such a description. Given that bid-
ders are behaving noncooperatively, the 
optimal strategy for each bidder is to bid as 
much as his valuation of the object, bi=b(vi). 
If this strategy is adopted by all bidders but 
one, the latter’s best response is to adopt it 
also (Riley & Samuelson, 1981). The end 
result is that the auction consists of optimal 
bids by bidders who think optimally. 
But these assumptions seem to fly in 
the face of evidence from behavioural deci-
sion making research. After the seminal 
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
growing evidence has supported the notion 
that, in contrast to expected utility theory, 
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the carrier of the utility of a choice is 
change from a reference point rather than 
over the state of wealth (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; 
Bateman et al., 1997). From the reference 
dependent utility, it follows that people are 
loss averse more than risk averse (Tverky & 
Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982), their decision are susceptible to the 
framing of choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Johnson 
et al., 2000), and weigh chance differently 
between different points of probability 
(Tversky & Fox, 1995). These violations of 
expected utility theory may explain the in-
ternal process of the winner’s curse. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984), refined by 
Thaler (1999), propose a construction of 
mental processes whereby individuals eva-
luate their financial-related decisions, from 
which they specify the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the options 
relative to a reference point. This represen-
tation, termed mental accounting, refers to 
the set of cognitive operations used by 
individuals to organise, evaluate, and keep 
track of their decisions. They propose three 
different types of mental accounts that can 
be used by the individual: minimal account, 
topical account, and comprehensive account 
(Thaler, 1999). Under minimal account, the 
utility of decision is calculated from the 
difference between any two or more op-
tions, disregarding the features they share, 
and thus is indifferent to contexts and inter-
temporal considerations. Topical accounting 
leads individual to consider the consequen-
ce of possible choices with regard to a 
reference level that is determined by the 
context within which the decision arises. A 
comprehensive account incorporates all other 
factors including current wealth, future 
earnings, possible outcomes of other proba-
bilistic holdings, and so on.  
Economic theory generally assumes 
that people make decisions using the com-
prehensive account. Consequently, compre-
hensive accounting prevents bidders from 
falling prey to the winner’s curse. How-
ever, behavioural research shows that peo-
ple make decisions piecemeal, influenced 
by the context of the choice, as evident in 
the following example. 
Imagine that you are about to pur-
chase a jacket for ($125)[$15] and a 
calculator for ($15)[$125]. The calcu-
lator salesman informs you that the 
calculator you wish to buy is on sale 
for ($10)[$120] at the other branch of 
the store, located 20 minutes drive 
away. Would you make the trip to the 
other store? 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
This problem consist of two choices; one 
with the figures in parentheses and the 
other with the figures in brackets. Experi-
ments on two separate groups found that 
on the choice of saving $5 of $15 calculator, 
68 percent of the participants were willing 
to make the 20 minutes journey; while only 
29 percent were willing to make the trip to 
save the same amount on a $125 calculator.  
Mental accounting may explain the 
cognitive processes that lead to the win-
ner’s curse in the laboratory context. In ex-
periments that report the winner’s curse, 
e.g., Kagel and Levin (1986) and Knetsch, 
Tang & Thaler (2001), subjects have to 
make decision about the amount of bid 
over a series of bidding session which con-
sist of around 18 bidding rounds within 
one to three hours. The physiological sen-
sations of winning or losing a bid that are 
felt by subjects from a previous round may 
influence the decision in the subsequent 
round. If the assumption that individuals 
use topical accounting when bidding is 
valid, then the value of vij – bij of winning 
bids on a particular session i will signifi-
cantly correlate with the value of vij+1 – bij+1, 
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after being adjusted to price and volume 
difference between sessions. In other 
words, the physiological sensations elicited 
in the previous session is carried through, 
and influences the decision in, the subse-
quent session. The level of carry-over effect 
is the function of adjustment to loss or gain 
in the former session, which, in turn, might 
be influenced by time lag between bidding 
sessions. Hence, it can be hypothesised the 
longer time between session the less carry-
over effect. However, this is not the focus of 
this study. 
The lack of significance of the correla-
tion may indicate the use of minimal or 
comprehensive account, particularly if the 
average vj – bj, close to zero, in which j=1, 
…, m rounds. However, this condition also 
implies that there is no winner’s curse. That 
is, evidence of the winner’s curse may indi-
cate that bidders were not using minimal or 
comprehensive account. 
Minimal accounting can be discrimi-
nated from comprehensive accounting by 
introducing inter-temporal utility of choice. 
The reason for this is that insensitivity to 
contexts would prevent individuals from 
contextual bias in their decisions, so that its 
effect on a single case decision it can not be 
distinguished from comprehensive. The 
introduction of inter-temporal utility will 
result in stronger correlation with strategic 
equilibrium bids when bidder use compre-
hensive account rather than minimal ac-
count. However, this research is not aimed 
at discriminating between the use of mental 
account of inter-temporal choice. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects use topical account 
rather than minimal or comprehensive 
account when making decision about 
the amount of bid. 
The distinctive feature of prospect the-
ory is the S-shaped value function, which 
implies that individuals are loss-averse. It 
means that the psychological consequence 
of the prospect of losing $X is felt more in-
tensely than the same prospect of gaining 
the same amount of dollar. Consequently, 
individuals are risk-seeking in contexts, 
that impose them with a probability of 
loses; while they prefer avoiding risk to as-
suming higher degree of risk even though it 
may give them higher expected outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). 
The evidence of loss-aversion that 
might be observed in laboratory auctions 
could arise from two factors. Loss-aversion 
results from topical accounting, especially if 
intervals between bidding sessions are not 
long enough for individuals to make ad-
justment to physiological arousal following 
the experience of losses or gains in previous 
bidding sessions. The emotional spill-over 
from the previous session implies that the 
result from the former session is used as the 
reference point in the subsequent session. 
Any session implies loss or gain, but loss 
leads to risk-seeking while gain leads to 
risk-aversion, therefore the direction of the 
correlation coefficient of vij – bij and vij+1 – 
bij+1 indicates the evidence of loss-aversion. 
It can be predicted that a loss in bj will be 
followed by higher vij+1 – bij+1, that turns to a 
positive correlation; while gains in bj will be 
followed by lower vij+1 – bij+1, or negative 
correlation. 
Hypothesis 3: Bidders’ decision in a par-
ticular bidding session is influenced by 
results of his bid on previous session. 
Specifically, losses in previous session 
lead individual to risk-seeking in the 
next session; while gains leads indi-
vidual to risk-aversion in the next ses-
sion. 
 




Fifty eight subjects were used in the 
present experiment. They were recruited 
among undergraduate students of the Fac-
ulty of Psychology, Gadjah Mada Univer-
sity, Indonesia (GMU). Participation in the 
experiment was voluntary and independ-
ent of any class assignment. 
Procedure 
Prior to the experimental auction 
rounds, subjects were briefed about the 
procedure of the experiment. A three 
rounds auction was also practised, and 
subjects discussed and confirmed their un-
derstanding about the tasks they asked to 
perform. Subsequently, those who agreed 
to participate signed an informed consent 
form. However, two subjects withdrew 
during the session. 
The setting was a contract tender for 
office supplies to GMU. In total 18 contracts 
for six kinds products were tendered on 18 
bidding sessions. Participants were in-
formed about the quantity and production 
costs for each product that was offered, an 
+/- 10% from the estimate costs. The real 
production cost was drawn randomly, by 
rolling a dice, after subjects submitted their 
bids. Table 1 summarises the estimate costs 
and quantity per product in each session. 
The tender was organised in three ses-
sions, 6 bidding rounds each, with a short 
break (10 minutes) between sessions. The 
minimum incremental offer was 50, and the 
lowest bid wins. If there were more than 
one winner, the contract was divided 
evenly between winning bidders. Loss and 
gain were computed by the following 
equation: (bid - production cost) x quantity. 
Positive value means gains, otherwise 
losses.  
The winner of each group was an-
nounced along with the amount of its bid. 
Other bidders’ bids were not announced. 
At the end of each session, all subjects 
who gained a positive balance were given a 
bonus of Rp. 1,000 that was paid in cash. If 
they could maintain the surplus through 
the next sessions, they were given another 
Rp. 1,000 for each session. Apart from that, 
an extra bonus was given to each subject 
who booked a surplus by the end of the ex-
periment. The amount was based on the 
rank in the group. The highest received Rp. 
50,000, followed by Rp. 30,000 for the sec-
ond highest and Rp. 20,000 for the third 
highest. The rest of the top ten were given 
Rp. 10,000, and the 11th – 25th highest re-
ceived Rp. 5,000, and all the other with sur-
plus were given Rp. 1,000.  
In every round subjects bid in small 
groups (3-4 bidders) or large groups (7-8 
bidders). Assignments to bidding groups 
were random, and compositions of bidders 
Table 1 
Summary of cost estimate and quantity per product per session 
Estimate cost / unit  Quantity 
Products 
- 10% v + 10% Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Photo copy paper 22.500 25.000 27.500 100 200 300 
File box 36.000 40.000 44.000 200 300 100 
Lined paper 27.000 30.000 33.000 300 100 200 
Floppy disk  45.000 50.000 55.000 100 200 300 
Board marker 31.500 35.000 38.500 200 300 100 
OHP transparency 41.500 45.000 49.500 300 100 200 
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on groups were reshuffled from round one 
to another. Participants were informed 
about the number of competitors in their 
group in each round, but not about whom 
she played against. In other words, subjects 
knew how many people they competed 
with, but did not know against whom.  
After the briefing and practice sessions, 
subjects were assigned to two separate 
groups in two rooms, Group A and Group B, 
and they were asked to sit at their seat 
number. The seats were arranged so that 
there were one chair in between of two 
seats. The experiment was run separately, 
so that there are basically two independent 
sets of data from experiment 1. 
Overall, experiment 1 took approxi-
mately 2 hours. Almost 1 hour was spent 
for administrations, briefing and practices. 
Each session took approximately 2 minutes, 
plus short break between sessions to an-
nounce and eventually to give the bonus. 
Results 
Some descriptive statistics and signifi-
cance of between-groups difference are 
summarised in Table 2. Some terms may 
need explanations. V-actual is the actual 
production cost of a product on each 
round, that was obtained by rolling a dice. 
Gp. A refers to subjects with odd-numbered 
seats that were assigned to Room A, and 
Gp. B are subjects in Room B. All Av-s are 
abbreviation of ‘average’. 
The table shows that Group A and 
Group B did not differ significantly across 
the first 12 rounds. The highest and the sec-
ond highest coefficients of significance are 
.081 (F=3.15, df=1) and .129 (F=2.09, df=1) 
respectively, and the lowest significant co-
efficient is .92 (F=0.1, df=1). This indicates 
the absence of systematic factors that influ-
ence bidding behaviours on these rounds, 
and thus can be treated equally. However, 
the difference became significant across the 
last 6 rounds, with the lowest coefficient at 
.03 (F=4.82, df=1). In these sessions Group A 
consistently bid lower than Group B, that 
is, they took more risks in their decision 
than Group B. The tendency toward risk-
seeking were also showed in the first two 
sessions, in which Group A bid less than 
Group B in 9 of 12 bidding sessions. 
Tests to indicate whether there are 
systematic influence of the number of com-
petitors on bidding decisions were also car-
ried out. The result indicates that there is 
no systematic differences between group 
sizes in all round, except round 3. In this 
round, the small groups bid significantly 
lower than the large group, with p=.015 
(F=6.245, df=1). Similar results were found 
from the comparison of winning bids in 
small and large groups. The results indicate 
that winners of large groups were not likely 
to suffer more or less curses than the win-
ners of small groups. It can further be con-
cluded that, in general, the size of groups 
do systematically influence individual deci-
sion-making in the context of this experi-
ment.  
The presentation of the production cost 
estimates was intended to help participants 
to find easily the expected value of the bid, 
which is v or the middle point of +/- 10% on 
Table 1. If participants were risk-neutral, 
they would have consistently chosen this 
point. However, if they wanted to both 
consider expected gains and the probability 
of winning, they would have discounted 
this valuation, so that it may have laid 
somewhere between the middle point or v 
and the +10% value. Although bidding at 
the area above +10% would promise higher 
return, but the probability that such a bid 
would win is considerably lower. Con-
versely, bids in the area between v and        
–10% run a considerable risk of losing 
money. 
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Table 2 
Summary of descriptive statistics 
Round 
Stats 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Upper value 27.50 44.00 33.00 55.00 38.50 49.50 27.50 44.00 33.00 
Middle value 25.00 40.00 30.00 50.00 35.00 45.00 25.00 40.00 30.00 
V-actual gp A 27.50 36.00 27.00 50.00 38.50 49.50 22.50 40.00 30.00 
V-actual gp B 25.00 44.00 27.00 50.00 38.50 45.00 22.50 44.00 27.00 
Average bids 26.16 39.81 30.94 49.66 35.11 45.04 25.79 39.84 29.97 
Av. bid gp. A 26.19 40.38 30.63 49.33 34.76 44.86 26.14 39.23 29.52 
Av. bid gp. B 26.13 39.26 31.24 49.99 35.46 45.22 25.44 40.43 30.44 
Sign of t-test A-B .920 .539 .274 .452 .247 .515 .406 .081 .129 
Small group 26.01 40.01 30.10 50.08 35.08 44.55 25.55 40.17 30.05 
Large group 26.26 39.65 31.45 49.41 35.13 45.32 25.94 39.62 29.93 
Sig. of t-test small-large .714 .847 .015 .452 .939 .179 .656 .433 .842 
Av. winner  23.50 39.19 28.98 46.90 33.05 42.82 24.13 37.02 27.96 
Winner small 23.05 39.28 28.43 48.04 33.09 42.79 24.43 37.42 28.24 
Winner large 23.94 39.13 29.53 45.43 32.99 42.88 23.73 36.62 27.73 




10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Upper value 55.00 38.50 49.50 27.50 44.00 33.00 55.00 38.50 49.50 
Middle value 50.00 35.00 45.00 25.00 40.00 30.00 50.00 35.00 45.00 
V-actual gp A 55.00 31.50 45.00 25.00 36.00 30.00 55.00 35.00 41.50 
V-actual gp B 50.00 31.50 45.00 25.00 44.00 27.00 45.00 31.50 49.50 
Average bids 48.90 34.49 43.75 24.32 38.84 29.18 47.86 33.39 43.74 
Av. bid gp. A 48.42 34.19 43.65 23.88 37.70 28.18 47.11 32.85 42.49 
Av. bid gp. B 49.37 34.79 43.85 24.76 39.93 30.22 48.63 33.97 45.03 
Sig of t-test A-B .238 .628 .762 .011 .005 .014 .032 .020 .000 
Small group 49.31 35.26 44.32 24.67 39.77 28.69 48.26 33.65 44.17 
Large group 48.63 34.05 43.43 24.11 38.20 29.47 47.51 33.25 43.50 
Sig. of t-test small-large .410 .352 .193 .128 .058 .372 .385 .438 .349 
Av. winner 46.51 30.74 41.47 23.24 36.98 27.55 45.96 32.10 42.31 
Winner small 47.00 32.93 42.13 23.58 37.37 27.70 46.28 32.30 42.73 
Winner large 46.02 29.09 40.56 22.94 36.64 27.40 45.72 31.95 41.83 
Sig. of t-test winner-loser .352 .362 .214 .086 .276 .213 .188 .255 .074 
 
 Fig. 1 visualises data of average and 
winning bids as compared to upper and 
middle value. It obvious that while average 
bids are pretty close to the expected utility 
of bids, so that the lines are almost indis-
tinguishable excepts on the last session, the 
winning bids are significantly lower. This 
indicates that the curse of winning occurred 
in this experiment. Since private informa-
tion has been omitted from the design and 
there is no systematic influence of group 
sizes, the winner’s curse in this data can 
only be explained by psychological and 
contextual factors, and the interactions 
between them. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Upper value, v+(10%v) Middle value, v Average bids Winning bids  
Figure 1. Upper and middle values, average and winning bids 
 
The psychological factor that was hy-
pothesised by this study was mental ac-
counting. The evidence of the winner’s 
curse in this data suggests that subjects 
were using topical accounts rather minimal or 
comprehensive accounts. Section 2 of this re-
port proposed a method to measure the 
presence of mental accounting from correla-
tions between successive bids. In particular, 
a topical accounting was argued to appear in 
opposite correlational directions among 
loses and gains contexts. In other words, 
profits in previous session would have lead 
a bidder to take lower risk by bidding more 
conservatively; while loses encouraged the 
bidder to take more risks.  
To substantiate this hypothesis, gains 
and loses were calculated by subtracting 
real production cost c at round i from a 
bidder’s bid b, or bi – ci. Since price discrep-
ancies between products may cause un-
equal weights, the value of c was stan-
dardised. Correlations between pairs of 
successive bids with total data result in 10 
and 7 positive and negative correlation co-
efficients respectively. Six of these correla-
tion coefficients were significant or highly 
significant. Besides, 2 positive correlation 
coefficients were below .001 and signifi-
cance coefficients of p above .900. This re-
sult indicates that there was no systematic 
relation between pairs of bids when the 
topical accounting is not taken into account. 
Bivariate analysis to distinguish effect 
of topical accounting performed subse-
quently. Within the gains context, 7 corre-
lation coefficients among successive bid-
ding pairs were in the negative directions 
as predicted, while 9 correlations were 
positive, and one pair was aborted due to 
insufficient cases. These results reveal that 
there were no systematic effects of gains in 
the previous round to the bidding in the 
subsequent round. 
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Table 3 
Correlation between pairs of successive bids 
Round 
Stats 
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 
r total -.279 .009 .257 .260 .177 .003 .161 -.120 .774 
Sig. (p)-total .035 .944 .053 .235 .183 .983 .231 .379 .000 
r after gains -.408 -.115 .257 .171 .267 .444 .161 .676 .605 
Sig. (p)-gains .011 .279 .027 .188 .305 .033 .115 .006 .000 
N of bidders 31 28 57 29 6 18 57 13 35 
r after loses .132 .177 - .229 .072 .042 - .050 .461 
Sig. (p)-loses .261 .180 - .121 .306 .398 - .376 .018 




10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 
r total .013 -.081 -.015 -.142 -.493 .667 .746 -.552 
Sig. (p)-total .924 .547 .910 .291 .000 .000 .000 .000 
r after gains -.252 -.076 -.211 -.021 .121 .287 -.048 .080 
Sig. (p)-gains .165 .288 .217 .463 .262 .074 .407 .337 
N of bidders 17 56 16 22 30 27 26 30 
r after loses .567 -1.00 -.153 -.219 .107 .257 .208 .313 
Sig. (p)-loses .000 - .167 .103 .301 .093 .144 .060 
N of bidders 39 2 42 35 26 28 28 26 
 
Analysis on bidding pairs that were 
preceded by ‘loses’ gave a better result. 
After 3 bidding pairs were excluded due to 
insufficient number of cases, 12 correlation 
coefficients were found in the positive di-
rection as predicted, while two correlations 
were in the opposite direction. This finding 
supports the notion about loss aversion and 
topical accounting in loses contexts.  
With regard to affective experiences, it 
was predicted that, in the absent of the 
winner’s curse, the second highest bidder 
would have suffered more regret than the 
lowest bidder. Consequently, the second 
highest bidder of this round was predicted 
to take more risk in the subsequent round 
than the lowest bidder. Table 1 shows that 
there were three rounds of the experiment 
where the winner’s curse absent, round 3, 7 
and 11. However, quite contrary to the pre-
diction, none of the coefficient of difference 
were significant. Furthermore, the average 
of second highest bidders’ bid was higher 
than the lowest bidders’ bid only in one 
case, round 8.  
Discussion 
The research question that this study 
wanted to answer was whether the tempo-
ral aspects of the cycle of decision-making 
in an experimental auction leads to 
anomalous decisions. It was argued that 
since an auction event implies gains and 
loses and that individuals need a certain 
duration to adapt to the affective experi-
ence, the effect of affective carry-over is 
ubiquitous in most of standard experi-
mental auctions. It was assumed that regret 
and mental accounting determine the di-
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rection of carry-over effects. Specifically, 
regret over the failure to act in the previous 
round was predicted to lead bidders to a 
higher risk-taking in the subsequent round, 
and topical accounting more prevalent than 
minimal and comprehensive accounting. 
The reference dependence utility leads to 
prediction that topical accounting leads in-
dividual to a different risk preference in 
different contexts, that is, gains and loses 
contexts. 
With regard to the effect of regret, this 
study failed to find evidence to prove or 
disprove the prediction. Statistical analysis 
resulted in no systematic indication about 
the evidence of the effect of regret on deci-
sion-making. However, this was due to 
limitations in the design of experiment. 
Subjects were only informed about the 
highest value on the bidding groups, with 
no reference to their position among all 
other bidders. Therefore, subjects might 
know the highest bid, but they could not 
ascertain whether their bid was second 
highest or the lowest. Therefore, reference 
about the evidence of regret on the subse-
quent bidding could not be established. 
In general, these predictions about the 
effect of topical accounting have been con-
firmed in this study. The winning bidders 
in this study suffered the winner’s curse, 
although the private information effects were 
omitted and the optimal bidding strategy 
could easily be identified. Apparently, topi-
cal accounting was more prevalent in bid-
ders’ cognitive process than minimal and 
comprehensive accounting. Further predic-
tions were also confirmed. Even though 
systematic relationship between successive 
bidding pairs were not found when data 
were analysed as a whole, close examina-
tion to different contexts revealed higher 
accuracy observation. Subjective experience 
of loses in a round was found to be corre-
lated positively with risk taking in the sub-
sequent round in 12 out of 14 successive 
bidding pairs. On the other hand, such a 
strong relationship was not found in the 
context of gains. This finding confirmed the 
reference dependent utility prediction of 
prospect theory that individual are loss 
averse rather than risk-averse. Bidders in 
this experiment seek more risks when they 
experienced loss in a previous round, and 
thus they amplified the possibility of being 
cursed in the auction.   
It needs to be emphasised that ‘loss’ 
and ‘gains’ in this context were not actual 
loses and gains. The data were obtained 
from all bidders in each round, from which 
only 12 bidders, or in some cases more than 
12, were actually have won the tender. Al-
though this strategy can be defended by the 
argument that bidders evaluate their bid-
ding strategy round by round, so that they 
experience the thrill of overbidding or un-
derbidding even though they were not the 
winners, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
assert that the reference point can be de-
termined by events that are only imagined. 
The frustration experienced in an unsatis-
factory auction round increases when it is 
easy to imagine a more desirable alterna-
tive. An individual’s experience of pleasure 
or frustration may therefore depend on an 
act of imagination that determines the ref-
erence level to which reality is compared. 
Nevertheless, there might be difference 
in emotional intensity between the real 
profits makers and the real victims with 
those who are not. It would have been bet-
ter if this line of thought could be com-
pared to the data from this experiment. 
However, this was not possible with the 
data that were available. Since the experi-
ment consisted only of 12 groups, so that 
there were only 12 winners, of which some 
may suffered loses while the other gains. 
Therefore, satisfactory statistical analysis 
on them would not be possible to obtain.  
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The possible implication of this finding 
to research on auctions in particular, and 
behavioural-decision making in general, are 
quite extensive. This study indicates that 
temporal aspects of a cycle of decision in-
duce bias in individual decision-making. 
Anomalies that might be found in such an 
event are therefore not related to irration-
ality of the individual as might be evident 
in the real world. Rather, it is more likely 
that the design of experiment failed to con-
trol carry-over effects of affective experi-
ence in the successive decision tasks. 
However, the generalisation of this 
finding needs to be taken cautiously. The 
temporal dimension on this study has not 
been varied, therefore variance among dif-
ferent scales of time can not be established. 
Consequently, although this study con-
cludes that temporal aspects could be the 
evil of the laboratory winner’s curse, it can 
not suggest any measure of the how power-
ful is the evil.  
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